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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUARANTY NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondent, 
vs. CASE NO. 16207 
BARBARA J. MORRIS, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff insurer, who paid $2,787.61 in No-Fault 
benefits to defendant insured, filed this lawsuit after the 
insured's personal attorney refused to endorse a check in 
said amount for the settlement with State Farm Insurance 
Company, the tortfeasors' liability carrier, without first 
receiving a one-third contingent fee therein. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 12-13), specifically holding the plain-
tiff had ". 0 0 no obligation to the defendant 0 •• for 
attornevs' fees or costs with respect to the subrogated in-
terests asserted by (plaintiff). o 0 for the no-fault payment 
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and benefits paid to ... (defendant)." (R. 84). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a ruling affirming the Judgment 
rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A written stipulation of facts was filed with the 
lower court for the purpose of determining the summary judg-
ment motions filed by both parties. (R. 52-81) These stipu-
lated facts indicate that the plaintiff, Guaranty National 
Insurance Company, as insurer, and the defendant, Barbara J. 
Morris, as the insured, entered into an insurance contract 
which provided, among other things, for No-Fault benefits 
pursuant to Section 31-41-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. (R. 52) This policy was in force on December 16, 
1975, when defendant was involved in an automobile collision 
with a Rick Chapman, insured by State Farm. (R. 52- 53) 
Following this accident, plaintiff insurer paid 
defendant $2,787.61 in No-Fault insurance benefits. (R. 52) 
On June 24, 1976, plaintiff gave written notice to 
State Farm of its claim for reimbursement of the No-Fault 
benefits paid defendant. (R. 53, 74) On :-Jovember 9, 1976, 
plaintiff was advised by State Farm that defendant had obtained 
the services of an attorney and that the reimbursement request 
could not be honored until the liability claim had been 
- 0-
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resolved. (R. 53, 75) On February 22, 1977, State Farm 
advised plaintiff of the name of defendant's attorney and 
that negotiations were still pending. (R. 53, 76) On 
December 22, 1977, defendant executed a release and settled 
with State Farm for $14,000, which was well within the limits 
of the tortfeasors' insurance policy with State Farm. (R. 53, 
77) 
No lawsuit was ever filed by defendant's attorney 
and the settlement of December 22, 1977 with State Farm was 
accomplished out of court. (R. 53) 
On January 6, 1978, defendant's attorney first 
advised plaintiff of defendant's settlement with State Farm. 
Defendant's attorney further advised plaintiff that the No-
Fault payments, which were being paid out of the $14,000 
settlement, were subject to a one-third contingent fee, 
totalling $928.27. (R. 53, 78-79) Prior to this letter of 
January 6, 1978, neither defendant nor her attorney had made 
demands or requests for attorneys' fees regarding the No-Fault 
interests due plaintiff from State Farm, and no agreement had 
been entered into between plaintiff and defendant regarding 
attorneys' fees. (R.S4) A one-third contingent fee arrange-
ment had been entered into between defendant and her attorney. 
(R. 54) 
State Farm Insurance Company sent a draft to plaintiff 
- 3-
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for the No-Fault benefits paid to defendant, but the draft 
was made payable to both plaintiff and defendant's attorney. 
Defendant's attorney refused to endorse the draft unless his 
alleged one-third contingent fee therein was put in trust, 
awaiting the outcome of this action. 
Plaintiff denied responsibility for any attorneys' 
fees or costs relative to the No-Fault reimbursement from State 
Farm (R. 80-81) and brought this action for a declaration that 
it was not responsible for such fees and for a release of any 
claim by defendant to those funds. (R. 1-3) Defendant answered 
and by way of counterclaim, asserted a right to attorneys' 
fees and costs of $928.27. (R. 9-10) Motions for Summary 
Judgment based upon these facts, were filed by both parties 
and, after a hearing thereon without a transcript, the Honor-
able G. Hal Taylor, Judge, entered an Order granting plaintiff's 
~otion for Summary Judgment and denying defendant's corres-
ponding ~lotion. 
ARGmtENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH'S NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT 
WAS ENACTED TO STABILI:E I~­
SURANCE COSTS BY PROVIDI:-.iG 
BINDING ARBITRATION BET\I'EEN 
I:-.JSURANCE CO~IPANIES ON THE ISSUE 
OF REDIBURSDIENT FOR PAID :\0-
F,'\ULT BENEFITS. 
From the stipulated facts, it appears clear that 
defendant's attornev did not represent plaintiff. Defendant's 
- -l -
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attorney never requested, in advance, the right to represent 
plaintiff Guaranty National on its no-fault claim, and no such 
permission was ever given to defendant's attorney by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff first became aware of the attorney's representation 
of their insured by way of letter, dated February 22, 1977, 
from State Farm. It was eight months prior to that time when 
plaintiff notified State Farm of its claim for reimbursement 
for ~o-Fault benefits as provided under Utah's No-Fault Insurance 
Act. 
To allow defendant's attorney to unilaterally appoint 
himself as attorney for plaintiff, and to then demand a one-
third contingent fee in the No-Fault recovery, is a violation 
of the public policy declared by the Utah Legislature in en-
acting Utah's No-Fault Insurance Act. 
The Utah No-Fault statute, by recognizing the rights 
of arbitration between insurers, makes it clear that the Legis-
lature wants to stabilize insurance costs by reducing unnecessary 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
Section 31-41-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended, provides: 
31-41-2. Purpose of act. 
* * * The intention of the legislature is 
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not 
effectuate certain savings in, the 
rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more 
- 5-
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efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the 
personal injur~ cla1ms that arise 
out of automob1le accidents, these 
being those not involving great 
amounts of damages. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 31-41-11 provides: 
31-41-11. Subrogation rights and 
arbitration between insurers. 
(1) Every insurer authorized to 
write the insurance required by this 
act shall agree as a condition to 
being allowed to continue to write 
insurance in the state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is 
or would be held legally liable for 
the personal injuries sustained by 
any person to whom benefits required 
under this act have been paid by another 
insurer, including the state insurance 
fund, it will reimburse such other 
insurer for the avment of such bene-
lts, ut not 1n excess o the amount 
or-damages so recoverable, and 
(b) That the issue of liability 
for such reimbursement and the amount 
of same shall be decided by mandatory 
bindin arbitration between the insurers. 
Emp asis a 
If it is intended that insurance costs be stabili:ed, 
it is not reasonable to pay attorneys' fees and costs that are 
unnecessary. Defendant's attorney is claiming a fee for 
services that plaintiff did not want and did not ask him to 
perform. He is claiming costs that plaintiff did not incur, 
did not authori:e and for expenses that served no purpose to 
Guaranty ~ational. If an insurance compan)· is required to pay 
·[)· 
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attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs for bringing actions. 
when there is binding arbitration provided by statute. insurance 
costs will increase rather than stabilize or decrease as was 
intended by the drafters of Utah's No-Fault Act. 
In State Farm Hutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange, 22 Utah2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969) 1 this 
Court upheld the right of one insurance company to recover from 
another for property damage and medical costs. The Court said 
that subrogation springs from equity, concluding that one who 
has been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be entitled 
to a second reimbursement. In a later case, State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah2d 166, 
493 P.Zd 1002 (1972), this Court held that, where one company 
had given notice to another of its subrogation claim, it was 
subrogated to recover medical expenses paid. 
The No-Fault statute, by recognizing the rights of 
arbitration between insurers, intended to avoid unwanted and 
unnecessary attorneys' fees and costs. 
Defendant's attorney's refusal to endorse State Farm's 
draft to plaintiff is contrary to the policy behind Utah's 
No-Fault Insurance Act, and interfered with Guaranty National's 
contractual subrogation rights. 
As noted above in Section 31-41-11, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953), as amended, the issue of liability for No-Fault 
reimbursements and the amount thereof is determined by arbitration 
- 7-
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between the insurers. By that statute, plaintiff Guaranty 
National is prohibited from filing suit for No-Fault benefits, 
unlike the usual insurance subrogation cases. For that 
reason, the cases cited by defendant in Point I of her brief 
are not applicable to this case involving No-Fault claims. 
In Point II of her brief, defendant has argued her 
rights to attorneys' fees by analogy from the Workmen's Compen-
sation Laws, which are clearly not analogous. There is no 
arbitration provision in the Workmen's Compensation statute. 
Furthermore, Workmen's Compensation statute, Section 35-1-62(2) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, specifically has 
provided for attorneys' fees. These critical differences 
preclude any meaningful parallels between the Workmen's Com-
pensation and No-Fault laws. 
In addition, defendant's arguments regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the arbitration statute for No-Fault 
benefits are not properly before this Court and are without 
merit. Section 31-~1-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (Arbi-
tration) applies only to insurance companies. ~o insurance 
company is before this Court raising any objections to that 
statute. Insurance companies universally are in favor of the 
statute because it enhances the amount of subrogation recoveries, 
reduces the costs of court and attorneys' fees, and avoids 
delays in the processing of claims between insurance companies. 
- 8-
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r-tos t insurance companies, nationwide, engage in 
arbitration of the standard automobile and other subrogation 
claims under an Inter-Company Arbitration Compact, which has 
been successful for the very reasons cited above. 
State Farm is willing and has agreed to repay the 
plaintiff the full amount of its No-Fault claim, as evidenced 
by the draft issued by State Farm. The defendant's attorney, 
who is not a party to this litigation, is the one blocking this 
payment based upon a claim for a one-third contingent fee from 
plaintiff which he did not represent. 
The claim in Appellant's Brief, Point II, that the 
rule against splitting a cause of action renders the arbitra-
tion section of the statute unconstitutional, is erroneous. 
The rule against splitting a cause of action is based 
solely on the desire of the courts to prohibit a multiplicity 
of lawsuits. See Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., SO Utah Zd 
.l27, 394 P.Zd 383. 
Obviously, the above statute does not permit the 
filing of a separate suit by the subrogation insurer, but does 
provide for a separate arbitration hearing, if that becomes 
necessary. The defendant is not being compelled to arbitrate 
her claims under the statute. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the statute that 
prohibits the injured party from including all of her special 
damages in her lawsuit. If she does, and a judgment is awarded 
- 9-
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for the full amount of her special damages, including her 
insurance company's subrogation interest, the amount of that 
interest is deducted by the trial judge from the judgment, 
for the very reason that she is not entitled to a double 
recovery or unjust enrichment. 
The insured's (injured party's) constitutional 
rights to due process, or any other rights, are not affected 
in any way. She has received her No-Fault benefits, which are 
payments made in advance for her injuries. By the reduction 
of the judgment to the extent of her advance payments, she has 
not been prejudiced, or her rights affected, in any way. 
Should the injured party (insured) and her attorney 
elect not to include the amount of the advance payments in her 
lawsuit, she is certainly not splitting a cause of action, and 
her insurance carrier, by statute, may then arbitrate their 
subrogation claim, if necessary. 
POINT I I. 
DEFE>JDA:--JT ~IORRI S HA.S BREACHED THE 
SUBROG.HION CL.\.USE OF HER INSUR.I\:--.ICE 
CONTRACT. 
Under plaintiff's insurance policy, No-Fault benefits 
are provided through endorsement 43 PIP. As regards subrogation, 
this endorsement provides: 
d. Subrogation. In the event of anY 
avment under this coveraae, the Com any 
lS subrogate to the rights ot the person 
- lll-
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to whom or for whose benefit such pay-
ments were made, to the extent of such 
pa~ments, and such person must execute 
an deliver instruments and papers and 
do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights. Such serson shall do nothing 
after loss to preju ice such rights. 
e. Reimbursement and Trust Agreement. 
In the event of any payment to any 
person under this coverage: 
1. the Company shall be entitled 
to the extent of such payment to the 
proceeds of any settlement or judg-
ment that may result from the exercise 
of any rights of recovery of such person 
against any person or organization 
legally responsible for the bodily 
injury because of which such payment 
is made; and the Company shall have a 
lien to the extent of such payment, 
notice of which may be given to the 
person or organization causing such 
bodily injury, his agent, his insurer 
or a court having jurisdiction in the 
matter; 
2. such person shall hold in 
trust for the benefit of the Company 
all rights of recovery which he shall 
have against such other person or 
organization because of such bodily 
injury; 
3. such person shall do whatever 
is proper to secure and shall do 
nothing after loss to prejudice such 
rights; 
4. such person shall execute and 
deliver to the Company instruments 
and papers as may be appropriate to 
secure the rights and obligations of 
such person and the Company established 
by this provision. 
Under this insurance contract, defendant agreed to 
execute and deliver instruments and papers and to do whatever 
- 11-
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else was necessary to secure plaintiff's subrogation rights, 
and not to do anything to prejudice its rights. State Farm 
had expressed a willingness to honor the plaintiff's No-Fault 
reimbursement request after the resolution of the liability 
claim. 
Following the settlement of the liability claim, a 
$2,787.61 draft was, in fact, mailed by State Farm directly 
to plaintiff to reimburse it for the PIP payments to defendant. 
State Farm recognized the right of plaintiff to be reimbursed 
in this amount. Defendant's attorney rendered no service in 
obtaining this sum. The draft was mailed to plaintiff and 
the only requirement as far as State Farm was concerned was 
that defendant's attorney endorse it. 
Utah recognizes both common law and written policy 
provisions allowing subrogation to the insurance company. 
In Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 
152 P.Zd 98 (1944), the court held an insurer was subrogated 
to the rights of the insured against the person whose wrong-
ful acts or omissions had caused the injury and that the suit 
could be brought in the name of the insured, rather than the 
name of the insurance company. State Farm ~utual Insurance 
Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra. (1969), State 
Farm ~utual Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
supra. (1972), and Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), support Guaranty 
~ationa1's right to the subrogation recovery. 
-1 =-
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Section 31-41-6 that describes the benefits one is 
entitled to receive under the No-Fault Act does not include 
a benefit for attorneys' fees and expenses in pursuing a 
claim against a third person. Defendant Morris, by and through 
her attorney, is trying to compel plaintiff to pay a benefit 
outside of the scope of PIP coverage, and in so doing, has 
breached the subrogation clauses of her insurance contract. 
POINT II I. 
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS 
NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, BUT EVEN 
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF IS OBLIGATED TO PAY 
THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS' FEES, UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
ONLY THE REASONABLE VALUE OF SERVICES 
CAN BE RECOVERED. 
The attorney for the defendant maintains that he 
should be compensated a one-third contingent fee of the plain-
tiff's ~o-Fault recovery inasmuch as he had a one-third contin-
gent fee agreement with the defendant as to her recovery. A 
one-third contingent fee to be deducted from the ~o-Fault 
reimbursement cannot be supported in this case, even if the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment were found to be applicable. 
In this case, no court costs were incurred, inas-
much as a lawsuit was never initiated. Defendant's attorneys' 
fees for services were obviously incurred for the sole purpose 
of recovering general and other damages not compensated by ~o-
Fault pavments from plaintiff. 
- 1 3-
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Defendant's attorney, when he first accepted her 
case, either knew or should have known about the ~o-Fault 
statute, and the subrogation requirements, and he should not 
now be permitted to ignore the statute and to recover a fee 
from the plaintiff who did not retain him. 
In 7 C.J.S., Attorney-- Client, Section 175, p. 1041: 
No one can legally claim compensation 
for incidental benefits and advantages 
to one, flowing to him on account of 
services rendered to another by whom 
the Attorney may have been employed 
or ... for services voluntarily 
rendered. 
See also, Seal v. Lefevre, 22 Utah2d 125, 449 P.2d 651 (1969), 
where this Court held that the individual cattlemen were not 
bound to pay a fee to an attorney employed by the Cattlemen's 
Association. 
In Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.Zd 335 (1947), 
a plaintiff was seeking to recover the value of services in 
procuring a purchaser for land. In discussing the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment, Justice Wolfe stated, at 337. 
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs 
when he has and retains money or 
benefits which in justice and equity 
belong to another. (Citations 
omitted.) The benefit may be on 
interest in money, land, chattels, 
or choses in action; beneficial 
services conferred, satisfaction 
of a debt or duty owed by him; or 
anything which adds to his security 
or advantage. 
The remedy where unjust enrichment has occurred was defined at 
- 14-
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in an action for unjust enrich-
ment, in those cases where there is a 
proper equitable basis for the same, 
the measure of damages, by the great 
weight of authority is the reasonable 
value of the services rendered. 
In the present case, an arbitrary one-third contingent fee is 
not the reasonable value of services rendered and evidence 
would have to be introduced on the reasonable time and nature 
of those services. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable 
in this case for reasons long recognized by this Court. In 
Baugh, supra., Justice Wolfe stated at 337: 
The mere fact that a person benefits 
another is not of itself sufficient to 
require the other to make restitution 
therefor. Restatement of Restitution, 
Sec. 1, comment c. Services officiously 
or gratuitously furnished are not re-
coverable. Restatement of Restitution, 
Sec. 2. Nor are services performed by 
the laint1ff for h1s own advanta e, 
an rom wh1ch the e en ant ene 1ts 
incidentalli, recoverable . See Re-
statement o Restitution, Sec. 40, 
comment c; and Sec. 41 (a) (i). 
* * * Generally, unless such services enhance 
or benefit the property of the defen-
dant or otherwise confer on him a direct 
benefit, they do not form the basis of 
a contract imposed by law because there 
is not 'unjust enrichment' as that term 
is used in law. Where such services 
operate to confer a direct benefit upon 
the defendant, they may be recoverable. 
* * * 
- l 5-
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The most that can be contended for 
plaintiff's efforts is that they made 
known to a willing purchaser the fact 
that the defendant's land was available 
for purchase at a certain price. This 
benefit, if such it was, was at best 
only a mere incident to the plaintiff's 
efforts to enrich himself. It did not 
increase the intrinsic value of the 
land. It did not give the defendant 
any legal rights which he did not 
previously have. It did not increase 
his estate, nor &ive him a ~osition 
of greater secur1ty. It d1 not 
remove any legal liability. 
* * * We do not think that plaintiff con-
ferred a 'benefit' upon the defen-
dant in the sense in which that term 
is used in the law of unjust enrich-
ment. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.Zd 205 (Utah 
1976), this Court held that a real estate broker was not en-
titled to a fee under the theory of unjust enrichment. The 
Court cited Baugh, supra., with approval, stating: 
The fact that a person benefits another 
is not itself sufficient to require the 
other to make restitution. Also, not 
recoverable are services officiously 
or gratuitously furnished; services 
performed by the plaintiff, for his own 
advantage, and from which defendant 
benefits incidentally. 
In the present case, the defendant provided services 
which were not needed or wanted by the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff's remedy was through binding arbitration as between insuran:, 
companies as set forth in Section 31-~1-11, Utah Code Annotated 
l1953), as amended. State Farm Insurance Company, the carrier 
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for the negligent third party, had acknowledged the plaintiff's 
rights to subrogation and only refused to pay until the liability 
claim had been resolved. 
Under the Baugh and Fowler decisions cited above, 
defendant's attorney cannot now claim compensation from plain-
tiff for services performed for the defendant's own advantage 
and from which plaintiff benefited only incidentally, if at all. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court correctly held that defendant's 
attorney is not entitled to attorneys' fees with regard to 
the ~o-Fault reimbursement from State Farm to plaintiff. 
This ruling is consistent with the purpose and 
public policy of the Utah Legislature in passing Utah's 
\lo-Fault Act; that is, to "stabilize'' and effectuate certain 
savings "in the rising costs of automobile accident insurance" 
and to "effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the great bulk of the personal injury claims that 
are out of automobile accidents." 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable 
in this case where no court costs were incurred, no lawsuit 
was ever filed, and where the defendant's attorney negotiated 
settlement for the defendant's own advantage, and did not 
enhance or benefit plaintiff's ability to recover the No-
Fault sums directly or by arbitration from State Farm. 
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DATED this t~ day of May, 979. 
submitted, 
HANSON 
D ID H. PPERSON 
HANSON, RUSSON, HA~SON & DUNN 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I hand-delivered two 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brjef to 
Attorney for Appella~, 1000 Boston B "lding, 
Utah 84111, this ~day of May, 1 9 
- l s-
true and correct 
Kent M. Kasting, 
Salt Lake City, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
